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iglRELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD:  VIEWS ON THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE
AND FOOD SECURITY
Canada
T.  K. Warley
Position and Posture
Canada ranks fifteenth in  the world in  per capita income,  tenth  in  industrial
output,  and  fourth in  trade.  As  such,  it  is  first and  foremost  a  member  of
the group of industrialized democracies, a  "leading nation,"  but ranking  in
the second tier, a "middle" power.
Canada's  foreign and foreign economic policies are aimed at fostering peace,
harmonious foreign relations,  stability in the international economic order,
and economic growth for Canada.  With trade accounting for 30 percent of gross
national product, 20 percent of employment, and almost  75  percent  of  the  value
of output of the goods-producing sector, Canada has the most trade-dependent
economy of the Western "summit nations."  Accordingly, trade  policy  is  a
prominent component of its foreign and foreign economic policies.
Historically, since its bilateral bargaining power with the  industrial
giants--the United States,  the European Community, and  Japan--has  been
perceived to be small, and because it  seeks to minimize  the  pull  of  the
gravitational field of the United States, Canada has favored multilateralism
in  its external economic relations and the creation of a  rule-oriented
international economic system.
With respect to the Third World, Canada's broad goals  are  to  promote
self-determination,  nonalignment, and accelerated development,  so  as  to
immunize the developing countries  from East-West conflicts rather than involve
them.
Canada has played an important and distinctive meliorist, broker, or
bridge-building role in  the North-South  dialogue.  It  is  uniquely  fitted  for
this task by its being both a  member of the Group B  countries and well
regarded by the Group of  77.  The reasons for  its acceptability to the LDCs
include:  it  has no colonialist past or geopolitical ambitions;  it  has  links
with a large number of LDCs through membership in  the Commonwealth and la
Francophonie;  it  shares  concerns over dependence on the United States; and as
a  country with a  weak manufacturing sector which exports resources and imports
capital and technology, it  shares many economic problems with developing
countries.  Also, Prime Minister Trudeau has sought a  leadership role in  the
field of  development  cooperation.  Hence,  Canada has  been  deeply  involved  in
the North-South  dialogue.  It  has  exercised  creative  diplomacy  in keeping  the
problems of the South on the agenda of the Western summit meetings, and in
seeking  to  break  los-jams;  and  give  momentum  to  deliberations  in meetings  of
Commonwealth  leaders,  at the  Western  summits,  in  the  Conference  on
International Economic Cooperation (CIEC),  in  the U.N. Assembly and Agencies,
and  at  Cancun.
Canada's direct economic  interests in  the Third World are also  substantial.
AlthouSh the LDCs--which take around 9  percent of its exports and supply 15
percent of  its  imports--are not as important as trading partners as they are
to the United States, the EEC, and Japan (Economic Council of Canada),
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countries are perceived as offering good trade growth potential in the future
(Dobson, Walker).  More particularly, together they offer some alternative to
the United States, which now takes 70 percent of Canada's exports but where
there is clear evidence of a secular slowing of the rate of  growth and a
threat of gathering protectionism (Daly).  Also, the LDCs  offer promising
investment opportunities for Canada,  especially in resource industries,
utilities, transportation,  and telecommunications,  the fields in which Canada
has a comparative advantage.
So far the LDCs have been treated as an entity.  In reality, "the South  is not
a homogenous group of  countries.  It contains countries with the highest per
capita income in the world and those with the lowest;  countries with the
fastest growth and countries suffering negative growth;  countries with the
world's biggest financial surpluses and those with the greatest deficits;
countries with abundant natural resources and those with none;  and  countries
with sophisticated modern industrial economies and those with rudimentary,
tribal, agricultural societies"  (Trudeau).  Canada's relations with Third
World countries are correspondingly characterized by diversity and nuance,
ranging from a relationship with the  least developed (LLDCs) that stresses aid
to relationships with the oil exporting and newly industrialized countries
(NICs) that emphasize trade, finance, and investment.
Development Cooperation
As noted above, at the rhetorical and political levels, Canada has been
generally supportive of the LDC's aspirations for the creation of  "a  new
international economic order"  (NIEO) and has sought to play a constructive
role in  the conduct of the North-South dialogue.  At the level of practical
policy action on the specific components of the NIEO, the record is  "spotty"
(North-South Institute, 1980a and 1980b).
Aid and trade policies and practices are sufficiently important to be treated
separately in  subsequent sections.
Canada has been very sensitive to the balance of payment and debt problems of
the LDCs.  This is  to be expected of a country which is  the seventh largest
provider of profit-seeking private loan and investment capital to the LDCs;
which has one-third of  its overseas private investment stock located in  them;
and whose banking system is  dangerously exposed  to possible defaults  on debts
by such countries as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.  Canada has supported
reforms and adaptations  in  the International Monetary Fund in  the areas of
increasing country quotas, expansion in  the number and scope of special
facilities, easier repayment terms, and  caution in  prescribing too large a
dose of deflationary medicine.  It  took the lead on the occasion of the CIEC
in  cancelling the aid-related debt of the poorest countries, and has
participated actively in  the restructuring of the debt obligations of several
Third World nations.
Canada has also played a  significant role in  the provision of multilateral
development finance.  It  is  a  member of all the Regional Development Banks.
In the World Bank, it  has supported program lending, change in  the gearing
ratio, and creation of an energy affiliate.
In respect to the "integrated program for commodities"  (IPC), Canada's
position has been passive, reactive, and ambiguous  (North-South Institute,
1551982).  As a net exporter--and a large one--of the "core"  commodities, and as
a country with shared problems with the LDCs  in its  commodity trade  (for
example, periodically adverse movements in its  terms of trade, earnings
instability, tariff escalation against fabricated products,  and high degrees
of foreign-ownership  and technological dependency),  it  might have been
expected that Canada would have been especially supportive of  this component
of the NIEO.  In practice,  it has moved cautiously, favoring "market
solutions"  to multilateral market management, taking a case-by-case approach
to stabilization-oriented consumer-producer international commodity agreements
(ICAs), and agreeing to the creation of only a  minimalist common fund.  It has
supported  improved market access for resource-based products and programs
aimed at market development and quality improvement.  Canada is  a  member of
the existing  ICAs for coffee, sugar, rubber, and tin, and will likely join
that proposed for jute.  And it is,  of course, a leading supporter of
international market management for grains.  On the other hand,  it has not
joined the agreement for cocoa, nor has  it favored the creation of ICAs  for
copper, iron ore, vegetable oilseeds, and timber.  It took the  initiative in
the formation of the uranium cartel, but has declined to  join the producers'
associations  for copper and iron ore.
Canada played the leading role in the decade-long negotiations in the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea  (Munro).  Throughout,  it  worked closely with
the LDCs,  and on many issues made common cause with the Group of  77.  In
particular, it supported the concept of the  seas being a "common heritage of
mankind,"  the establishment of international  institutions to  govern their use,
and  the principle of sharing the revenues obtained from the recovery of
polymetallic nodules  they contain.  Of course, Canada's  larger interests were
in the recognition of a 12-mile territorial  sea, a 200-mile exclusive economic
zone, jurisdiction over the fish and other resources of the  continental shelf
for Coastal States, and control of mineral production from the Abyssal Plain.
On other issues of the NIEO (for example, institutional reform, the  transfer
of technology, the regulation of the behavior and treatment of multinational
corporations, patent reform, shipping, and the contrived relocation of
industrial  activity),  Canada has made few distinctive contributions.  Indeed,
as was the case on issues of international commodity policy, Canada has rarely
broken ranks with the other Group B countries  (North-South Institute, 1979).
Development Assistance
While this is perhaps the  least important interface between the LDCs and  the
developed countries,  it is  one of  the more  tangible.  To Canadians,  it is also
a  matter of some sensitivity because of the origin  of the 0.7  percent-of-GNP
target in the Pearson Commission.
Participation  in the provision of overseas development assistance (ODA) is
animated in Canada, as elsewhere, both by considerations of humanitarianism
and global solidarity and by self-interest.  There is tension between these.
Genuine concerns with real development lead to an orientation in Canada's ODA
toward a role as  catalyst rather than principal;  a stress on building
indigenous development capacity rather than projects;  a focus on agricultural,
rural, and human development rather than an urban-industrial and
infrastructural focus;  and a cultural rather than an economic model of the
development process (Canadian International Development Agency).  By contrast,
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out-bid the Communists, buy a seat in international councils, subsidize
Canadian industry, and create customers  for Canadian products.
Canada's aid program has never been a model among the OECD's Development
Assistance Committee, and recently it has been lacklustre.
In terms of aid "targetry,"  disbursements as a percentage of GNP slipped from
0.49 to 0.42 between 1978/79 and  1980/81, and with recent cuts, may be below
0.4 percent in 1982/83.  The stated goal is  to give 0.5 percent of GNP by 1985
and to endeavor to attain the 0.7 percent target by 1990.  However, aid is
increasingly seen by the Government and by the people as a  major expenditure
item which is  often wasted or stolen, and which readily lends itself to
economies.
In terms  of "quality,"  Canada's aid program ranks "fair to middling" insofar
as:  the grants-to-loans ratio is high;  loan terms are mostly so  soft as  to be
near-grants;  there is a ratio of 40:60 between multilateral and bilateral
programs;  35 percent of bilateral aid  is  directed toward the LLDCs and 75
percent to the MSA countries;  and the Canadian International Development
Agency  (CIDA) has adopted the "basic needs" theme  and singled out food and
agriculture, energy, and human resource development as  priorities for Canada's
development assistance programs.  Long-standing weaknesses in the program
include a  high degree of "tying"  (80 percent of bilateral aid must be spent on
Canadian goods, with not less  than two-thirds  of  the value-added being in
Canada),  and the fact that aid is  administered  in a  highly centralized system
and disbursed over an impossible-to-manage  80-plus countries.  Many fear that
quality will deteriorate further in the future as  the emphasis shifts from
doing good to doing well (that is,  to  building up  "cashable" political and
commercial credits),  as the proportion of multilateral aid is lowered  (perhaps
to a ceiling of 35  percent), and as more assistance is concentrated on
lower-middle  income developing countries that  offer better market
opportunities for Canadian industries  (including the Canadian agriculture and
food sector).  Additionally, the  early commitments to agriculture and rural
development and to enhancing world food security seem to be weakening.  Such
developments would be regrettable since "Canada's aid performance has  for some
years been viewed  as  the main redeeming feature  in an otherwise
undistinguished  record of action in response to the Third World"  (North-South
Institute 1980a).
Food Aid
In 1980/81 Canada's food aid shipments were "valued" at just over $180
million.  This was about 15  percent of each of  its total multilateral and
bilateral aid disbursements in that year.  Food aid  in calendar 1981 accounted
for about 14 percent of the value of total agricultural exports  to developing
countries  (except China and Cuba),  and 2  percent of  all agricultural exports.
Contributions to multilateral programs account for some 60 percent of Canada's
total food aid, while 40 percent is  donated bilaterally.  The major
multilateral effort is  support of the World Food Program in implementation of
Canada's commitment, under the Food Aid Convention, to supply 600,000 tons of
grains as  food aid annually (CIDA).  Grain is  the major commodity Canada
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rapeseed oil are shipped regularly, and donations  of other products  (for
example, egg powder, potatoes, and even beef) have been made sporadically.
In Canada, as elsewhere, the food aid program has been variously criticized
for:  being too niggardly (the FAC commitment was reduced from 750,000 tons to
600,000  in 1978);  not being made in forward pledges  and in quantitative terms;
creating disincentives  to agricultural production in  recipient  countries;
being  a  vehicle  for disposing  of  domestic  surpluses;  and  for  not  being  used
sufficiently to develop  commercial markets for Canada's  exports.
Additionally,  it has been said that multilateral food aid  (which is  largely
controlled by Agriculture Canada) is not well  integrated with the bilateral
food aid program (which  is  administered mainly by CIDA),  and that food aid is
poorly integrated with Canada's nonfood development assistance (Cohn).
However, this is  but symptomatic of a larger problem.  Having no Ministry for
Development, Canada's aid programs generally lack focus, and--more generally
yet--there is  but poor coordination in Canada between development assistance
efforts and the nonaid dimensions  of the North-South relationship.
Trade
Trade is  clearly the  central factor in the North-South equation.  As noted
earlier, with LDCs taking  9  percent of  exports and supplying 15 percent of
imports, Canada's trade  is not notably oriented towards the LDCs.  Reasons  for
this  include:  the high proportion of  resource-based products  in Canadian
output;  its historical position "which has been that of a  peripheral entity
linked with metropolitan economies based beyond its borders--first France,
then Britain, and now the United States"  (Economic Council of Canada);  and the
large share of'its manufacturing  industry that consists of  foreign-owned
branch plants producing for the national market.  However, the proportion of
Canada's trade done with the LDCs has been slowly rising (in 1966-70, the
figures for exports  and imports were 7.5  and 8.8 percent,  respectively);  and
with the developing countries expected to account for more than 25  percent of
the increase in world production and about 30 percent of the increase  in world
trade in this decade (External Affairs  Canada),  the general trade relationship
between Canada and the Third World is taking on increasing significance.
In agricultural trade, the importance of this relationship is  an established
fact.  In 1981,  the LDCs provided 18 percent of Canada's agricultural
imports.  In that year, the developing countries  (excluding China and Cuba)
absorbed 16  percent ($1,386 million) of all Canada's agricultural exports
(China took a further 8 percent);  15  percent of  its  shipments of grains, grain
products,  and animal feeds;  and 14  percent of all exports of  oilseeds and
oilseed products (Agriculture Canada).  In some recent years,  the proportions
have been higher.  Looking to the future, Canada sees the geographic shift in
the direction and momentum of  its agricultural exports being still more
towards  the LDCs  (and the centrally planned economies),  since these markets
(especially OPEC and the NICs) offer a dynamic that the United States, Western
Europe, and perhaps Japan, do not possess, given the saturation of their food
demand and the inelasticity of their agricultural supply--even with some
easing (which is unlikely) of their agricultural support policies
(Agricultural Institute of Canada).
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some attention to  its credit arrangements and marketing institutions.  The
perception is  that Canada is  unable to meet competition in  the rates,
coverage, or terms of export credits, and  that a  growing number of LDCs prefer
to deal with state trading agencies.  Accordingly, some consideration is  being
given to matching  the subsidy element in  the credit arrangements available to
other agricultural product exporters (Export Market Development Task Force),
and Canagrex will be a  parastatal trading agency able to deal  on a
government-to- government basis.  Such arrangements will not apply to Canada's
trade in  grains.  The Canadian Wheat Board is  such an agency, and it  already
has access to special credit facilities.
Market growth in  the LDCs  for Canada's  total and agricultural exports  is
dependent on their having adequate earnings of foreign exchange.  Unless the
South exports to the North, it  cannot pay for the North's exports to the
South.  The conditions  of access to the Canadian market for LDCs present a
mixed picture.  Canada already provides duty-free entry for many tariff-line
items and low duties for many more.  By 1988, when the Tokyo Round tariff cuts
are fully implemented,  some 80 percent of Canada's trade will be duty free.
However, Canada still retains tariff "peaks" on sensitive products, and tariff
escalation provides high levels of effective protection for value-adding
activities in  Canada, especially for the processing of agricultural products.
Furthermore, some of Canada's protection is  directed at raw and processed
agricultural products  (for example tobacco, fruits and vegetables, beef,  and
sugar) that are of export interest to a  range  of developing  countries.  Also a
preferential tariff  structure for sugar favors Australia and South Africa  (and
Commonwealth Caribbean countries)  over LDC  suppliers.
A  generalized system of preferences for the LDCs was introduced in  1974.  It
is  to be extended  to 1992.  It  provides virtually all the LDCs with access to
the Canadian market at the British Preferential tariff rate, or two-thirds of
the MFN rate.  However, its benefits to the LDCs are not large.  Among the
reasons  for this are:  the inclusion of many of the highest income developing
countries and  three Eastern European countries  (Bulgaria, Romania, and
Yugoslavia);  a  rule that not more than 40 percent  of the value of the product
can be accounted for by imported components  (including imports from other LDCs
but excluding imports from Canada);  and a wide range of products are excluded,
including most agricultural and food products  and such sensitive manufactures
as textiles, apparel and leather, and rubber footwear (albeit that the  latter
are subject to quantitative import restraints)  (North-South Institute 1980b).
Consideration is  presently being given to a  widening of the product coverage
and the adoption of cumulative rules of origin.  However, in  the present
environment, there is  little prospect that Canada's GSP arrangements will
become significantly less niggardly.
Indeed, regrettably, the conditions of  access to the Canadian market for Third
World  countries, particularly the NICs, have worsened markedly in  the past 3
years.  Faced with the triple onslaught of recession, high unemployment, and
intense foreign competition, Canada has moved to restrict access for textiles,
apparel, leather goods,  and footwear by a  battery of  global quotas and
bilateral 'voluntary'  export-restraint  agreements.  These arrangements have
been forced on the weak by the strong, they have avoided the obligations of
the GATT, they are not subject to multilateral surveillance, they have no
termination dates,  and  they  are  discretionary  and  discriminatory.  In
mitigation,  it  may  be  said  that Canada's position  is  much  influenced  by  its
having  too  much  of  its  industrial structure in  mature,  standard-technology
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are located in a  handful  of key electoral ridings in Quebec and the Ottawa
Valley, and by the need to prevent the Canadian market from being swamped by
the backwash of products that have been deflected towards Canada by the
protective measures of other countries  (North-South Institute 1980c).  It has
also been claimed that even under restraints, import penetration ratios for
textiles  (25 percent) and apparel  (7  percent) are high by international
standards and no worse than mandated under the Multifibre Agreement.  Finally,
it may be noted that while supplies from the NICs are only part of the
competition provided by imports from all sources, they are the  least
acceptable because of wage-rate differentials,  lower environmental standards,
and poor working conditions.
World Food Security
On this theme of the North-South dialogue, Canada's record  is credible.
Agricultural and rural development have been priority in the bilateral
assistance programs conducted by CIDA and the  (uniquely  constructive)
International Development Research Centre.  Canada has encouraged efforts  in
this area by multilateral  institutions,  for example,  the World Bank, Regional
Development Banks, the  International Fund for Agricultural Development, and
the Food and Agricultural Organization  (FAO).  It has been a large bilateral
and multilateral supplier of  food aid.
Canada has also been a consistent supporter of proposals  to organize world
grain markets  through a consultative arrangement for coarse grains  and by a
Wheat Trade Convention with economic provisions in a renewed International
Wheat Agreement  (IWA).  To be sure, Canada's desire for an IWA is animated
primarily by domestic  and "First World" considerations,  for example, the
search for mechanisms that  would assure an adequate minimum  wheat  price  and
stability for Prairie agriculture;  provide equitable international  sharing  of
the costs of holding stocks and adjusting  consumption and  production  to
changing market conditions;  and attenuate the dangers of  destructive
subsidized competition among the exporters.  Nonetheless, potentially, the
pricing, stocking,  and adjustment provisions of the agreement on which
negotiations were held in the 1977-79 period had the capacity significantly to
enhance food security for the LDCs.  In the event,  like other exporters,
Canada could not accept the LDCs' stance on  the level and width of  the trigger
prices, the aggregate  size of national stocks, and  the terms surrounding the
LDCs' stocking obligations.  In the absence  of an agreement, elements in
Canada have pressed  for the formation of a "coalition of exporters" to
collaborate informally in grain-market management.  It  is  not self-evident
that such a  development would be in the best interests of LDC  food importers.
Canada has not favored the proposal made by the Secretariat of the World Food
Council for the creation of a system of LDC-owned but internationally financed
security reserve stocks, arguing that such stocks would be cost ineffective,
inadequate to the task of stabilizing grain markets, and incapable of being
operated within a negotiable framework (Hill).
Conclusion
Like other developed countries, Canada has been hard pressed to maintain a
balance between promoting LDC interests and coping with LDC pressures, between
the wish to assist generously and the reluctance to adjust appropriately.
160There has been an all-too-familiar mix of confusions and inconsistencies in
the Canadian response to the various subjects  that constitute the agenda of
the North-South dialogue.
Indeed, there has been a yawning gap between, on the  one  hand,  Canada's early
recognition of the need for change in the international economic order, and
her policy and practice on the other.  In many respects, Canada's performance
has fallen well short of the hopes of her development community, of the
promise of her rhetoric, and of her capacity.
Worse, there are signs that Canada is  now withdrawing from North-South problem
solving  and  is  "jockeying  for  a  low-profile  and  inoffensive  location  in  the
Western convoy" (North-South Institute, 1980a).
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